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Legislative Representation and the
Environment in African Constitutions
CARL BRUCH, ELANA ROFFMAN, & EUGENE KIM*
Constitutions can empower or constrain efforts to protect the
environment and public health. Often, they do both. Considera-
tion of constitutional environmental law has frequently focused on
constitutions as a source of environmental rights and obligations
that can be invoked by citizens, governments, and non-govern-
mental organizations to protect the environment or public health.
These constitutional provisions include the right to a "clean" or
"healthy" environment, right to life (interpreted to include a right
to a healthy environment in which to live that life), and right to
health, as well as procedural rights (such as the rights of access to
information and access to judicial review) necessary to enforce
those rights.1 The body of constitutional case law on the environ-
ment has grown over the past decade around the world-in Latin
America, Europe, Asia (particularly South Asia), and Africa.2 In
the United States, state courts have also started to enforce envi-
ronmental provisions in state constitutions, 3 although the vast
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1. See, e.g., Carl Bruch et al., Constitutional Environmental Law: Giving Force to
Fundamental Principles in Africa, 26 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 131 (2001); Richard 0.
Brooks, A Constitutional Right to a Healthful Environment, 16 VT. L. REV. 1063
(1992).
2. See, e.g., Ben Pontin, Constitutional Environmental Law: A UK Perspective,
17 NAT. RES. & ENV'T (2002); Earthjustice: Human Rights and the Environment-
Developments, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, 58th Sess., Geneva, Mar. 18-Apr. 16,
2002 (identifying 109 countries with environmental provisions in their constitutions);
MICHAEL BOTHE, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN EUROPE (forthcoming).
3. See, e.g., John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously
When it Protects the Environment: Part I-An Interpretive Framework for Article I,
119
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majority of U.S. environmental litigation remains rooted in statu-
tory and regulatory causes of action.
The relevance of the structural aspect of constitutions is also
starting to command attention. First and foremost, constitutions
are constitutive, organic documents that establish the framework
for government setting forth the respective roles and authorities
for the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of govern-
ment.4 Constitutions also define the relationships between na-
tional government and sub-national authorities such as states,
provinces, and districts. In defining governmental responsibili-
ties, constitutions can empower or limit the authority of national
governments to take specific actions. For example, many constitu-
tions grant broad police powers to national legislatures, empower-
ing them to enact environmental legislation.5 In contrast, the
U.S. Constitution reserves most of these police powers to the
states; and most U.S. environmental law rests on the authority of
Congress to enact legislation that relates to interstate commerce.
6
In the United States, conservative judges have interpreted
the Constitution to limit national actions to protect the environ-
ment in a variety of ways. 7 Some courts have questioned whether
the Constitution limits the power of Congress to protect the envi-
ronment where its link to interstate commerce is too tenuous;8 to
Section 27, 103 DICK. L. REV. 693 (1999); John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania
Constitution Seriously When it Protects the Environment: Part II-Environmental
Rights and Public Trust, 104 DICK. L. REV. 97 (1999); Bruch et al., supra note 1, at
160-61, 202.
4. See OUTLAWS LEGAL SERVICE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at http://
www.outlawslegal.com/refer/ch04.htm (last visited, Oct. 16, 2003).
5. Telephone Interview with Antonio Benjamin, Professor of Law, University of
Texas at Austin Law School (Jan. 24, 2003); cf. Proposing an Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States Respecting the Right to a Clean, Safe, and Sustainable
Environment, H.R. 33, 107th Cong. (introduced by Rep. Jackson). Section 2 of this
proposed constitutional amendment would provide that "Congress shall have power to
implement this article by appropriate legislation." Id.
6. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCCI.
7. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, "Greening" the Constitution-Harmonizing Envi-
ronmental and Constitutional Values, 32 ENvTL. L. 809 (2002).
8. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159. See also United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251
(4th Cir. 1997) (holding that an attempt by the Army Corps of Engineers to extend
jurisdiction to include all waters whose degradation "could affect" interstate com-
merce exceeds the authority of the Clean Water Act as circumscribed by the Com-
merce Clause); Hoffman Homes v. United States, 961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that there was no connection between Congress' Commerce Clause powers
and migratory bird fly-ways).
At the same time, the Commerce Clause has been a source of authority for Con-
gress to regulate waste management, as evidenced by the long string of dormant com-
[Vol. 21120
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convey broad standing to citizens and nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) to enforce federal environmental laws;9 to enact leg-
islation that diminishes the value of people's property without
compensating them for the diminution in value;10 or to subject
states to suit by citizens.'1 Similarly, some courts have attempted
to invoke constitutional provisions to constrain the ability of the
executive branch to enact regulations that give form and detail to
environmental laws.' 2 Courts have even limited their own au-
merce clause cases. See, e.g., Oregon Waste Sys. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S.
93 (1994); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994); Chemical
Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978).
9. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S.
83 (1998) (rejecting the standing of an NGO to bring a case for past violations). But
see Fed. Elections Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (in a non-environmental case,
granting standing to an NGO for informational injury that was shared with the gen-
eral public); Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (the
first Supreme Court case to uphold standing for citizens and NGOs in an environmen-
tal case in a decade); N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Group v. Whitman, 321 F.3d 316
(2d Cir. 2003) (upholding standing for citizens to challenge air regulations where the
alleged injury was based on concern about future health impacts from regulatory
changes).
10. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001). But see
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 U.S. 2448 (2001); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). It is an intriguing, but probably purely
academic, question whether Congress could seek to fund its "regulatory takings" of
property by fees assessed on property owners where Congressional action increases
the value of their property.
11. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 528 U.S. 765
(2000) (holding a Vermont agency immune from a qui tam suit brought by a private
individual); Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 1113 (2002) (holding that the state of West Virginia was immune in federal court
from a citizen suit seeking to enforce the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act); Pa. Fed'n of Sportsmen's Clubs v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2002) (following
the Bragg holding); Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1052 (2000) (holding that state officials are immune under the Eleventh
Amendment from citizen suits brought under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Resources
Conservation and Recovery Act); W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 147 F.
Supp. 2d 474, 481 (S.D.W.V. 2001) (holding that West Virginia was immune from a
citizen suit notwithstanding the court's finding that "federal law has been ignored
and violated by West Virginia for more than a decade."). Courts have also held that
the Eleventh Amendment shields states from private actions before federal adminis-
trative agencies. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S 743 (2002);
R.I. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2002).
12. United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997); Am. Trucking Ass'n v.
U.S. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (invoking the non-delegation doctrine to
hold that the Clean Air Act unconstitutionally delegated authority to Environmental
3
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thority on constitutional grounds, holding that separation of pow-
ers constrains judicial action to enforce the law in suits that are
brought by non-governmental actors. 13 To address these constitu-
tional challenges to environmental law, initiatives such as the En-
dangered Environmental Laws Program at the Environmental
Law Institute are seeking to reframe the debate around constitu-
tional environmental law in the United States.
In Africa, and elsewhere, scholarly attention is turning to
structural issues associated with constitutional environmental
law. 14 For example, it is increasingly recognized that constitu-
tional frameworks provide the executive branch with sufficient
authority (in law and practice) over the judiciary that judicial in-
dependence, and thus accountability, of the executive is the excep-
tion rather than the rule.15 This article focuses on the role of
legislatures, and specifically on the constitutional measures that
promote or limit the ability of elected members of a legislature to
represent their constituencies or affect the ability of the public to
hold their elected representatives accountable. This is referred to
generally as "legislative representation."
In the constitutional context, legislative representation often
is facially ambiguous and only becomes an issue in the practice of
day-to-day politics. For example, constitutions may establish a
legislature based on proportional representation, in which citizens
cast votes for a particular party and legislative positions are allo-
cated to the parties based on the percentage of popular vote that
each party receives. Each party then designates its legislative
representatives. The legislative representatives are not, strictly
speaking, elected to represent a particular district, and as such
are not directly accountable to any particular constituency other
than the party that designated the legislative representative.
Thus, members of a community affected by industrial pollution,
timber concessions, or large-scale mining operations are unlikely
Protection Agency (EPA) to establish health-based national ambient air quality stan-
dards). But see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (unanimously
overruling the D.C. Circuit).
13. See supra cases cited in note 8.
14. Peter Veit et al., Serving Constituents, Servicing Nature: Legislative Represen-
tation and Natural Resource Politics in Africa (Washington, D.C., World Res. Inst.
Pubs., 2004).
15. See, e.g., Jennifer Widner, Building Judicial Independence in Common Law
Africa, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOC-
RACIES 177-93 (Andreas Schedler et al. eds., 1999); JUDmICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE
AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD (David O'Brien
& Peter H. Russell eds., 2001).
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to find an enthusiastic representative in the legislature. Yet, in
many of these instances, communities do not receive significant
benefits from the development, but they bear the brunt of the so-
cial, public health, and environmental harms. Similarly, a provi-
sion that establishes that a legislative representative must be a
member of a political party to hold office may seem reasonable,
until the legislative representative tries to represent some constit-
uents in a matter that contradicts the priorities of his or her
party. In such a situation, the party can threaten the representa-
tive with expulsion from the party, which could have the immedi-
ate effect of revoking the representative's mandate.
Legislative attempts to review governmental actions or exer-
cise power frequently clash with the executive branch, particu-
larly with regard to management of valuable resources. For
example, in Sao Tome & Principe, the president threatened to dis-
solve parliament after it had sought to limit his control over the
new oil industry in the Gulf of Guinea; a recent coup ended with
control of the oil industry taken from the president and placed in
the hands of the National Assembly. 16 In Liberia, a few legislative
representatives collaborated with NGOs and the media to scuttle
a bill that would designate the president as the sole authority to
negotiate natural resource concessions. 17
Peter Veit and colleagues articulated four basic aspects of leg-
islative representation: accountability, autonomy, authority, and
ambition.18 These entail the accountability of legislative repre-
sentatives to their constituents; autonomy of legislative represent-
atives from political parties, the executive branch, and their
legislative peers; authority of legislative representatives to take
action on behalf of constituents; and personal ambition of the leg-
islative representatives. 19 This article focuses on the first three of
these aspects-accountability, autonomy, and authority-as they
play out in three different phases of a legislative representatives'
tenure.20 Frequently, these conceptual aspects of representation
16. Veit et al., supra note 14, at 13 (noting that when the president had control
over the oil, he had not allowed parliament to take part in the negotiation of conces-
sions); see also Sarah Simpson, Abidjan, Sao Tome Coup Leader, President Sign Ac-
cord, Voice of America News, July 23, 2003, available at web.lexis.com/lawschool/reg/
researchlogin.asp (last visited Oct. 16, 2003).
17. Veit et al., supra note 14, at 20.
18. Id. at 11.
19. Id. at 10.
20. In addition to the three primary areas of focus for this research-accountabil-
ity, autonomy, and authority-personal ambitions also influence the functional ac-
1232003]
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are linked. For example, in considering a country's electoral sys-
tem, there may be issues of accountability to constituencies
through elections and autonomy from political parties, as outlined
above. Similarly, accountability to constituents and autonomy
from political parties may overlap in how a legislative representa-
tive may be removed from office.
Section I explores how constitutional provisions regarding
election of legislative representatives affect representation, such
as through the selection of the country's electoral system, require-
ments for party sponsorship, and voting procedures. These
themes generally relate to accountability, autonomy, or both. Sec-
tion II delves into the authority of legislative representatives to
act on behalf of constituents while serving in the legislature. Af-
ter surveying general provisions on the duties of legislative repre-
sentatives and the rights of constituents, this section considers
various powers of legislative representatives (and constraints on
those powers) to represent their constituents' interests. These
powers range from law making and debating to budgetary deliber-
ations. Section III returns to the matters of accountability and
autonomy in the specific context of removing a legislative repre-
sentative from office, investigating how constitutional frameworks
grant different sectors the power to recall a legislative representa-
tive or otherwise revoke the legislative representative's mandate.
Section IV offers a few concluding thoughts on legislative repre-
sentation and the environment as shaped by African
constitutions.
This article relies upon a survey of the constitutions of fifty-
three African nations,21 with a few caveats. The status of some
countability of legislative representatives for representing their constituencies.
Researchers have suggested that many legislators view their work primarily as a job,
not as public service. Veit et al., supra note 14, at 17. To remain in office, these
legislators focus their outreach on constituents immediately before and after elec-
tions. Through parties, cash incentives, and other modest measures, legislative rep-
resentatives seek to curry favor with enough voters to ensure their return to power.
Constitutional measures addressing the term of office (i.e., how often representatives
must stay in the good graces of their constituencies) and term limits affect the ability
of representatives to use elected office to advance their own personal ambitions over
their constituents' interests. Veit et al. cite another example of how ambition can
affect a representative's motivation: in Kenya where an opposition representative op-
posing the construction of a dam was appointed deputy minister, concurrently, the
opposition party merged with the Kenya African National Union, and the opposition
chair became Minister of Energy (with responsibility for dams). Veit et al., supra note
14, at 14.
21. The fifty-three countries considered in this article include the fifty-two mem-
bers of the African Union (AU) plus Guinea-Bissau.
124 [Vol. 21
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African constitutions is unclear, creating methodological research
challenges. For example, Somalia has effectively degenerated into
non-statehood and is trying to develop a new constitution; 22 Su-
dan's constitution was partially suspended in 1999; Kenya is un-
dergoing a constitutional review process; and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo is functioning under a transitional constitu-
tion.23 In such instances, we have used the last formally adopted
constitution, recognizing that the constitutional framework may
change in the near future. This constitutional survey is comple-
mented, where possible, by references to scholarship and case
studies (some of which are on-going).
I. Becoming a Legislative Representative
From the outset, a candidate for Parliament or the legislature
encounters a variety of constitutionally imposed mandates and
constraints that shape whether that person can effectively re-
present a popular constituency. This section examines how consti-
tutional provisions governing elections of legislative
representatives can affect representation.
In many countries, constitutions establish the electoral sys-
tem, determining whether a representative has a constituency
(e.g., in a first-past-the-post system) that the representative must
represent effectively in order to be returned to office, or whether
the representative is primarily indebted to a political party for the
seat that the representative occupies. Constitutions often deter-
mine whether a candidate must be a member of a political party to
run for office, the nature of the balloting, and whether legislative
representatives are elected directly or indirectly. Constitutions
are also starting to address campaign finance, which also influ-
ences those interests that a legislative representative is most
likely to represent.
A. Electoral System
There are two basic types of systems for electing legislators in
Africa: first past the post (FPTP) and proportional representation
22. Discussions to negotiate a new constitution for Somalia have been slow, with
reports (perhaps apocryphal) that after a week of intense negotiations in early 2003,
the negotiators were able to agree on three words: "We, the undersigned."
23. Similarly, Swaziland suspended its 1968 constitution in 1973, and its 1978
constitution was never presented to the people. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2003, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geps/
wz.html/#govt (last modified Aug. 1, 2003).
20031 125
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(PR). FPTP refers to a system in which the candidate who re-
ceives the most votes, even if it is not a majority, becomes the
elected representative. 24 There is a modified version of FPTP re-
ferred to as a "Two-Round system," in which a candidate with a
majority of the votes wins in the first round of elections, or if no
candidate has a majority there is a run-off election between the
two candidates with the most votes from the first round and the
candidate who wins a majority of votes in the second round be-
comes the representative. 25
The proportional representation system presents the electo-
rate with a list of parties for which to vote, sometimes with the
names of candidates and sometimes without. 26 After the vote; the
parties are allocated seats in the legislature corresponding to the
proportion of the popular vote that the party garnered in the elec-
tion. Each party then takes the corresponding number of candi-
dates from the top of its party list, each of which becomes a
representative. 27
Andrew Reynolds has outlined many of the advantages and
disadvantages of the FPTP system. 28 The FPTP system provides
a clear choice for voters between two main parties; however, addi-
tional parties often wither away and almost never reach a thresh-
old of popular support. Thus, the national vote that these
candidates earn does not translate into comparable percentages of
parliamentary seats. The FPTP system can give rise to single-
party governments, benefiting broadly based political parties. In
societies that exhibit significant ethnic or regional divisions,
FPTP is praised for encouraging political parties to be "broad
churches" that encompass many elements of society; this is partic-
ularly the case when there are only two major parties and many
different societal groups. 29 Perhaps the most often quoted advan-
tage of FPTP systems is that they give rise to a parliament of geo-
24. See Andrew Reynolds, First Past the Post-Advantages, at http:l
www.aceproject.org/main/english/es /esd01a.htm (last modified Sept. 21, 2001) [here-
inafter Advantages].
25. See Ben Reilly & Andrew Reynolds, Two Round System, at http://www.ace
project.org/main/english/es/esd04.htm (last modified Nov. 7, 2001).
26. See Richard E. Matland, Women in Parliament: Beyond the Numbers, at ch. 3,
at http://www.idea.int/women/parl/ch3c.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2003).
27. Andrew Reynolds, PR Systems, at http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/
esf.htm (last modified Nov. 7, 2001).
28. See Advantages, supra note 24. Compare Andrew Reynolds, First Past the
Post-Disadvantages, at http://www.aceproject.org/main/englishles/esd0lb.htm (last
modified Nov. 7, 2001) [hereinafter Disadvantages].
29. Advantages, supra note 24.
126 [Vol. 21
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graphical representatives: legislative representatives represent
specific cities, towns, or regions, so that localized constituencies
have a voice in the legislative process. This is particularly signifi-
cant for land and natural resource issues, as well as pollution,
which tend to be location- and context-specific.
At the same time, however, FPTP systems tend to exclude or
marginalize minority parties and women from equitable represen-
tation in parliament. Where there is a dominant ethnic popula-
tion, FPTP systems can encourage the development of ethnic
parties that dominate a particular region. In many instances,
FPTP systems exaggerate "regional fiefdoms" in which one party
wins all the seats in a province or district, leaving a large number
of "wasted votes."30 For example, in Kenya's 1993 election, signifi-
cant disparities between the sizes of electoral districts-the larg-
est had twenty-three times the number of voters as the smallest-
contributed to the ruling Kenyan African National Union party's
win of a large parliamentary majority with only thirty percent of
the popular vote. 31
The proportional representation system also has its benefits
and setbacks. In a PR system, voters generally know the values
and positions for which they are voting, namely those espoused by
the party, which is then responsible for determining which indi-
viduals will hold the seats won by the party. 32 However, constitu-
ents in PR systems are "unable to hold individual legislators
accountable because voters cannot identify and contact the legisla-
tor who is responsible for serving their particular electoral district
because there are no districts in a PR system and no legislator is
assigned this task."33
In certain instances, legislators in a PR system may have a de
facto constituency, as they have a political base in a particular re-
gion (for example, as a former mayor or governor) or may be as-
signed a particular region in which to build popular support for
the party. As a legal (and constitutional) matter, however, these
legislators are primarily accountable to the party which deter-
mines which individuals will hold the party's seats in parliament.
The constituencies in a PR system have only the loosest sanctions
over or ability to support specific representatives.
30. See Disadvantages, supra note 28.
31. Id.
32. See Advantages, supra note 24.
33. Designing Better Electoral Systems for Emerging Democracies, at http:ll
www.uiowa.edu/-electdis/moreinfo.htm (last modified in 2001).
2003] 127
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The constitutional provisions that dictate the electoral system
can mean that legislative representatives do not have a constitu-
ency to which they are responsible. Without a constituency to
hold them accountable, legislators may be reluctant to challenge
political decisions supported by the government or the legislator's
party. Thus, members of a community harmed, for instance, by
industrial pollution, timber operations, or large-scale mining are
unlikely to find a sympathetic representative or effective voice in
the legislature. In a few instances where there has been a clearly
defined constituency, the constituency has proven that it can hold
legislators accountable. For example, in Zimbabwe, a representa-
tive from an opposition party allegedly started supporting the gov-
ernment's land policies, in effect working at cross-purposes to the
principles of the opposition party. Constituents demanded his res-
ignation, and the opposition party expelled the representative,
which the Parliament Speaker then declared vacant. 34
African constitutions exhibit a diversity of approaches in ad-
dressing which electoral system shall be adopted. Some constitu-
tions clearly articulate the electoral system, while others are
ambiguous or silent. As illustrated in Table 1, infra, constitutions
of five countries stipulate use of the FPTP system, and in six coun-
tries the PR system. Twelve constitutions either use a combina-
tion of FPTP and PR, or another method of election. For example,
article 48 of Liberia's constitution provides that election to the
House of Representatives follows a Two-Round system, and the
Senate (in article 45) is elected by a purely FPTP system.35 One
way that constitutions provide for a combination electoral system
is by having a portion of parliamentary seats set aside for special
interest groups. 36 Another example of a combination electoral
system is in the constitution of Malawi, which provides for a sena-
tor from each district who is elected by a district council, a chief
from each district who is elected by all the chiefs of the district,
and "thirty-two senators elected by a two-thirds majority of sitting
members of the senate" representing interest groups, society, and
34. Veit et al., supra note 14, at 12.
35. LIBER. CONST. ch. V, arts. 45, 48. As discussed above, in a Two-Round system,
the first election is FPTP, and if there is not a majority winner, a runoff election is
held.
36. See, e.g., UGANDA CONST. ch. VI, art. 78 (requiring one woman for each dis-
trict, as well as representatives for "youth, army, workers, persons with disabilities
and other groups as Parliament may determine"); see also ETH. CONST. ch. VI, art. 54;
SUDAN CONST. ch. II, art. 67.
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religious contingencies.37 Four constitutions establish that an or-
ganic law will determine the electoral system. Twenty-six consti-
tutions, approximately half of those in Africa, are silent regarding
the electoral system; in these countries, the electoral system is es-
tablished and governed by legislative and regulatory acts.
38
Another distinction that can be made is in the number of rep-
resentatives from each district; that is, whether a district is a sin-
gle-member district (SMD) or a multi-member district (MMD). In
an SMD, voters elect one legislative representative per election,
while in an MMD, the voters in that district will elect more than
one representative.3 9 One concern about SMDs is that minority
communities or interests will not be represented because tech-
niques used to delimit electoral districts, such as gerrymandering,
can be used to ensure that only those representing particular
groups are elected. Because of the larger base constituency in
MMDs and the chance to elect multiple representatives, a party
often can have different constituents' interests in mind when se-
lecting their party list in order to attract the most number of
votes.40
Similarly, a sufficiently large minority group voting as a block
can seek to ensure that it has a voice in Parliament, even if the
group would not otherwise have enough votes collectively to elect
the top vote-getter (the winner in an SMD). In an MMD with, say,
four positions at stake, the group only needs its candidate to gar-
ner the fourth greatest number of votes. Most PR electoral sys-
tems use MMDs, although they do not necessarily contain such a
provision in their constitutions. 41 While some FPTP countries
have MMDs (usually countries that follow block electoral sys-
tems), more have SMDs; in both cases, however, the policy deci-
37. See MALAWI CONST. ch. VI, art. 68.
38. As a matter of constitutional law, Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad,
Comoros, Congo, Cote D'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Ke-
nya, Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Sao Tome &
Principe, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, and Zambia all are silent on the issue of the method
the country is to use in its election of legislators.
39. See Lisa Handley, Single Member Districts: Advantages & Disadvantages, at
http://www.aceproject.org/main/englishfbd/bdabza01.htm (last modified Feb. 4, 2002).
40. See Andrew Reynolds, Districting, at http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/
es/esc04.htm (last modified Nov. 11, 2001); Richard E. Matland, Women in Parlia-
ment: Beyond the Numbers, at ch. 3, at http://www.idea.int/women/par~ch3c.htm (last
visited Oct. 28, 2003).
41. Ben Reilly, District Magnitude, Administration and Cost of Elections, at http:/
/www.aceproject.org/ main/englishles/esg04.htm (last modified Nov. 7, 2001). See also
ANGL. CONST. pt. III, ch. III, art. 79.
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sion of whether to adopt a single-member or multi-member
district is not always articulated in the constitution. 42
Table 1: Electoral Systems, as Established by African
Constitutions43
Proportional Determined by
First Past the Post Representation Organic Law Other/Combination
Gambia Angola Nigeria Botswana
Ghana Cape Verde Rwanda Burundi
Lesotho Equatorial Guinea Sierra Leone Cameroon (P)
Swaziland Namibia Sudan Democratic Republic
Uganda Zimbabwe of the Congo44
Ethiopia
Guinea (P)
Liberia
Madagascar
Morocco
Seychelles (P)
South Africa
Tanzania
45
Note: "P" denotes countries that use a parallel system, which includes elements of
both PR and FPTP.
4 6
42. Mauritius, which uses a block system of election (a form of FPTP, see Han-
dley, supra note 39), provides for MMDs in section 31(2), first schedule 1(1). The
SMD countries that use an FPTP electoral system are: BoTs. CONST. ch. V, pt. 1, art.
63; GAM. CONST. art. 50; GHANA CONST. ch. VII, art. 47(1); LESOTHO CONST. ch. VI, pt.
1, art. 57(1); SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. IV, art. 38(2), UGANDA CONST. ch. V, art. 63(1);
ZAMBIA CONST. pt. V, art. 77(1). The constitutions of Burundi, Madagascar, and
Tanzania-combination systems-provide for SMDs in articles 96, 66, and 60(3),
respectively.
43. ANGL. CONST. pt. III, ch. III, art. 79; BoTs. CONST. ch. V, pt. 1, art. 58(2)(a);
BURUNDI CONST. tit. VI, arts. 96-99; CAMEROON CONST. pt. I, art. 3; CAPE VERDE
CONST. pt. IV, tit. I, ch. I, arts. 106, 107; ch. III, § I, art. 112; § III, arts. 122-23; EQ.
GUINEA CONST. § V, art. 61; ETH. CONST. ch. VI, pt. I, art. 54; pt. II, art. 61(3); GAM.
CONST. ch. V, pt. 5, art. 54; GHANA CONST. ch. VII, art. 50(a); GUINEA CONST. tit. IV,
art. 50; LESOTHO CONST. ch. VI, pt. 1, art. 57(1); LIBER. CONST. ch. V, arts. 48, 49;
MADAG. CONST. tit. V, § I, sub-tit. II, ch. I, arts. 66, 67; MOROCCO CONST. tit. III, art.
38; NAMIB. CONST. ch. 7, art. 49 (sch. 4); NIG. CONST. ch. V, pt. I, art. 77; RWANDA
CONST. tit. III, ch. II, § I, art. 58; SEY. CONST. ch. VI, pt. I, arts. 78 (sch. 4), 79; SIERRA
LEONE CONST. ch. VI, pt. I, art. 74; S. AFR. CONST. ch. IV, art. 46(1); SUDAN CONST. pt.
VII, ch. III, art. 128(4); SwAz. CONST. ch. IV, art. 32; UGANDA CONST. ch. VI, art.
78(1)(a); ZIMB. CONST. pt. 3, art. 38.
44. Democratic Republic of the Congo has a transitional constitution, which calls
for appointment of legislative representatives by the government in article 56.
45. TANz. CONST. ch. III, pt. II, arts. 66, 78. See also Alex T. Banzi, Voting for
Democracy (1998), at http://www.aceproject.org/main/samples/vr/vrx-wOl2.pdf.
46. See Andrew Reynolds, Parallel, at http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/
ese0l.htm (last modified Sept. 17, 1998).
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While this article focuses on how constitutions affect legisla-
tive representation, for purposes of subsequent analysis, it is help-
ful to take a broader view of electoral systems in Africa, whether
they are rooted in constitutional or other organic enactments.
This broader view of electoral systems is useful, for example,
when considering how to interpret a constitutional provision re-
quiring party sponsorship in light of a constitution that is silent
on the electoral system. Where there are some disputes about the
electoral system that a country uses, and the constitution has in-
cluded a provision, the constitutional provision is used as the au-
thority. Table 2 summarizes the Electoral systems in African
nations, however determined.
Table 2: Electoral Systems in Africa4 7
Proportional Combination-
First Past the Post Representation electoral system
Chad (TRS) Algeria Botswana
Central African Republic (TRS) Angola Burundi
Comoros (TRS) Benin Cameroon (P)
Congo (TRS) Burkina Faso Cote D'Ivoire
Djibouti (B) Cape Verde Democratic Republic
Egypt (TRS) Equatorial Guinea of the Congo
Ethiopia Eritrea Ethiopia
Gabon (TRS) Guinea-Bissau Guinea (P)
Gambia Libya Kenya
Ghana Mozambique Liberia
Lesotho Namibia Madagascar
Mali (TRS) Sao Tome & Principe Morocco
Mauritius (B) Zimbabwe Seychelles (P)
Niger (P) South Africa
Nigeria Tanzania
Rwanda
Senegal (B)
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Swaziland
Togo (TRS)
Tunisia (B)
Uganda
Zambia
Note: "TRS" denotes countries that have a Two-Round system, a modified form of FPTP.
"B" denotes countries that use a block system, a modified form of FPTP.48
47. See supra note 43 and accompanying Table 1 in text. See generally CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK 2003 (index of information available by
country), http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html (last visited July 29,
2003).
48. A block system is defined by the Ace Project as: "the use of First Past the Post
... voting in multi-member districts. Each elector is given as many votes as there are
seats to be filled, and they are usually free to vote for individual candidates regardless
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B. Party Sponsorship
A number of constitutions provide that a candidate for legisla-
tive office must run as a member of a political party. This require-
ment implicitly but directly imposes an obligation on the
candidate and often on the legislator, once elected, to remain in
the party's good graces. If a candidate, even an incumbent, does
not adequately represent the party, vote as the party demands, or
speaks out on behalf of constituents in a way that may contravene
the party's positions, the party may simply expel or suspend the
person from the party. Faced with prospects of party disciplinary
measures that could revoke the legislator's mandate, a candidate
could be more beholden to a political party than a constituency.
In some instances, a candidate facing a choice between party
dictates and responsibilities to constituencies could change parties
so as to be affiliated with a party that more closely represents the
candidate's views. A paucity of parties in many countries means
that this option is often limited. Another related difficulty, dis-
cussed in section III below, is that a serving legislator who was
elected as a representative of a particular party could be expelled,
or threatened with expulsion, from the party, if the legislator rep-
resents his or her constituency to the detriment of the party. Such
an expulsion could lead to an immediate loss of the representa-
tive's seat in the legislature.
Only seven nations' constitutions have addressed whether a
political party must sponsor candidates or if candidates can run in
their individual capacity. In Guinea and Tanzania, a person can-
not run for legislative office without representing a political
party.4 9 In contrast, in Angola, Cape Verde, Congo, Kenya, and
Nigeria, candidates can run either with a party or individually. 50
There does not seem to be a correlation between countries that
require a party to represent candidates and that country's electo-
ral system. Nigeria and Congo are FPTP systems; Angola and
Cape Verde use PR systems; and Guinea, Kenya, and Tanzania
use combination FPTP/PR systems.
of party affiliation." Andrew Reynolds & Ben Reilly, Electoral Systems, at http:ll
www.aceproject.org/main/englishles/esdO2.htm (last modified Sept. 17, 1998).
49. See GUINEA CONST. tit. I, art. 3; tit. IV, art. 48; TANz. CONST. ch. III, pt. II,
arts. 67, 77.
50. The constitutions that allow for party or individual sponsorship are: ANGL.
CONST. pt. III, ch. III, art. 80; CAPE VERDE CONST. pt. IV, tit. I, ch. III, § I, art. 113;
CONGO CONST. tit. VI, art. 97; KENYA CONST. ch. III, pt. 1, arts. 33, 34; NIG. CONST. ch.
V, pt. I, art. 65.
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C. Tribalism, Racism, and Restrictions on Political Parties
African constitutions frequently establish limitations on polit-
ical parties, particularly with respect to the ability of parties to
advocate local or otherwise sub-national agendas. Such provisions
reflect the histories, cultures, and politics in many countries.
Many countries in Africa owe their current borders to the parti-
tioning of Africa by colonial powers in the late 1800s. 51 Borders
reflected the priorities and compromises of European nations, not
the cultural, physical, or social realities of the region. Thus,
Tanzania has more than 130 ethnic groups, 52 the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo has more than 200 ethnic groups,5 3 and Nige-
ria has more than 250 ethnic groups. 54
In order to promote national harmony and a national identity,
African constitutions often formally seek to limit opportunities for
tribal differences to drive the political process. 55 Accordingly, a
number of constitutions forbid the formation of a party based on
geographic location, race, or religion; instead, parties are sup-
posed to advance national interests. A limited number of constitu-
tions also limit where a political party or candidate can get
funding for their campaign. 56
Many constitutions have provisions similar to article 4(4) of
Guinea-Bissau's constitution, which states that "it shall be prohib-
ited to create Political Parties that are regional or local in nature,
which encourage racism or tribalism, or which support violent
means in pursuing their goals."57 Moreover, article 4(5) further
provides that "[t]he names of Political Parties may not be identi-
fied with any areas of national territory or invoke the name of any
individual, church, religion, cult or religious doctrine."58
51. See http://www.postcolonialweb.org/Africa/akindelela.html (last modified
Apr. 12, 2002); THoMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA (1992).
52. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2003: TANZANIA, http:/
/www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tz.html (last modified Aug. 1, 2003).
53. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2003: CONGO, DEMO-
CRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cg.html
(last modified Aug. 1, 2003).
54. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2003: NIGERIA, http:ll
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html (last modified Aug. 1, 2003).
55. Amb. Francis M. Deng, Senior Fellow, Dilemmas of Self-determination: A
Challenge to African Constitutionalism, U.S. Inst. of Peace (July 24, 2003), available
at http://www.usip.org/fellows/reports/2003/0724_RPTdeng.html (last visited Oct. 17,
2003).
56. BURUNDI CONST. art. 63; GHANA CONST. ch. VII, art. 55(15).
57. GuINEA-BISSAU CONST. tit. I, art. 4(4).
58. Id. tit. I, art. 4(5).
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D. Conditions of Voting: Universal, Secret, and Equal
When it comes time to cast votes, the conditions for voting can
influence whether voters are free to vote for candidates that they
believe will best represent their interests or whether voters might
be intimidated by voting conditions to cast their votes in a differ-
ent manner. Accordingly, universal, secret, and equal suffrage
can promote legislative representation. Commentators have ar-
gued that a constitution that limits voting and fails to provide for
a universal system undermines the foundation of a democracy be-
cause the system fails to ensure that every voice is heard.59
Twenty-two African constitutions call for universal suffrage
by secret ballot and equal treatment before the law. Seven addi-
tional constitutions contain provisions for universal and secret
voting, but not equal elections. Four other countries call for uni-
versal suffrage, and eight more countries have a secret ballot. The
final twelve countries call for the organic law to create a method
for election of legislative representatives. 60
59. See ACE PROJECT, ACE ELECTRONIC PUBLICATION (index of articles), at http://
www.aceproject.org/main/english/index.htm (last modified Sept. 5, 2003).
60. Constitutions that specify universal suffrage are: BENIN CONST. tit. III, art.
80; CENT. AFR. REP. CONST. ch. I, tit. IV, arts. 46, 47; MADAG. CONST. tit. I, art. 6; tit.
IV, § I, ch. I, art. 66; MOROCCO CONST. tit. III, art. 37.
Constitutions that specify secret suffrage are: ALG. CONST. pt. II, ch. II, art. 101
(Council of Senate); EGYPT CONST. pt. II, ch. II, art. 87; ERI. CONST. ch. IV, art. 31;
GHANA CONST. ch. VII, art. 49; LIBER. CONST. ch. VIII, art. 77; NAMIB. CONST. ch. VII,
art. 47; SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. IV, art. 36; ch. VI, pt. I, art. 74; SoMAL. CONST. ch. I,
§ I, art. 61.
Constitutions that specify universal and secret suffrage are: ALG. CONST. pt. II,
ch. II, art. 101 (National People's Assembly); CAPE VERDE CONST. pt. IV, tit. 1, ch. III,
§ I, art. 113; ch. I, art. 105; EQ. GUINEA CONST. § V, arts. 60, 61; MoZAM. CONST. pt. I,
ch. III, art. 30; pt. II, ch. III, art. 134; pt. III, ch. I, art. 107; S. AFR. CONST. ch. I, art. 1;
ch. II, art. 19; TUNIS. CONST. ch. II, art. 19; UGANDA CONST. ch. VI, art. 78; ZAMBIA
CONST. pt. V, art. 63.
Constitutions that specify universal, secret, and equal suffrage are: ANGL. CONST.
pt. I, art. 3; § II, ch. III, art. 79; BURK. FASO CONST. ch. IV, tit. II, art. 33; tit. V, art. 80;
CAMEROON CONST. pt. I, art. 2; pt. II, ch. I, art. 15; CHAD CONST. tit. I, art. 36; tit. IV,
arts. 107, 110; COMOROS CONST. tit. I, art. 4; CONGO CONST. tit. I, art. 3; tit. II, art. IV;
tit. VI, art. 90; COTE D'IvOIRE CONST. ch. II, tit. III, art. 33; tit. IV, art. 58; tit. V, art.
80; DJIB. CONST. tit. I, art. 4; tit. V, art. 46; ETH. CONST. ch. III, pt. II, art. 38; ch. VI,
pt. I, art. 54; GABON CONST. tit. I, art. 4; tit. III, art. 35; GAM. CONST. ch. IV, pt. 2, art.
26; ch. V, pt. I, art. 40; pt. 5, art. 53; GUINEA CONST. tit. I, art. 2; LESOTHO CONST. ch.
III, art. 20; MALAWI CONST. ch. I, art. 6; ch. III, art. 40; ch. VI, art. 68; MALI CONST. tit.
II, art. 27; tit. V, art. 61; MAURITANIA CONST. ch. II, art. 3; NIGER. CONST. tit. I, art. 7;
tit. IV, § I, art. 64; RWANDA CONST. ch. I, tit. I, art. 8; ch. II, tit. III, art. 58; SAO TOME
& PRINCIPE CONST. pt. I, art. 6; SEN. CONST. tit. I, art. 3; tit. VI, art. 60; SEY. CONST.
ch. V, art. 24; ch. VI, pt. I, art. 79; TOGO CONST. tit. I, art. 5; tit. III, art. 52.
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E. Direct and Indirect Elections
Once the ballots have been cast, the electoral system may al-
low the candidates with the most votes to immediately claim vic-
tory (deemed a "direct election"), or it may be necessary for an
electoral college or other body to convene, consider the results of
the popular election, and then elect the legislators (deemed an "in-
direct election").
In an indirect election, there is an intermediate step between
voting by the public and the actual election of the legislator, presi-
dent, or other elected official. In this intermediate step, elected
representatives (for instance in an "electoral college") meet and
vote for a candidate on their constituents' behalf, taking into ac-
count the results of the popular election. 61 In most instances, the
results of an indirect election through an electoral college are the
same as the popular vote. 62
In contrast, a direct democracy is a political system in which
all citizens are allowed to influence policy or elections by means of
a direct majority vote. Based on the democratic principle of "one
person, one vote," proponents of the direct over indirect electoral
method claim many advantages. First, direct popular election is
deemed to be the most representative and responsive to the will of
the people. Second, direct voting can limit the influence of numer-
ically small but politically powerful pressure groups. In order for
a proposal to gain a majority in a referendum, it has to offer ad-
vantages to a much larger cross-section of the population.63
Third, direct elections also seek to avoid a situation where a candi-
date wins office even though he or she lost the majority vote.64
At the same time, scholars find theoretical and practical flaws
with the direct model. The most noted flaw is the risk of dema-
61. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, Democracy, at http://www.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Democracy (last modified Oct. 25, 2003).
62. Id.
63. John F. Knutson, Direct Democracy, at http://www.basiclaw.net/Principles/Di-
rect%20democracy.htm (last modified May 19, 2002).
64. For example, in the United States, each state delegation to the Electoral Col-
lege endorses a candidate with all of its votes depending upon the majority outcome in
its own statewide tally. There is no difference between a candidate that won with
50.1% of the vote in the state and 87% of the vote. Accordingly, in the 2000 U.S.
presidential election, George W. Bush won 271 electoral votes (and the Presidency) to
Al Gore's 266 votes, although Gore won the popular vote by 0.5%. See Mary Mosert,
Final Official Vote Results on Bush-Gore Popular Vote Totals, at http:fl
www.bannerofliberty.comOS12-0OMQC/12-20-2000.1.html (last visited Oct. 28,
2003). In the 1876 presidential election, Samuel Tilden won the popular vote by 3%,
but lost in the Electoral College to Rutherford Hayes. Id.
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goguery, also referred to as tyranny of the majority. In this case, a
candidate can win on a dubious pledge to reduce the rights or ben-
efits of the minority in favor of the majority. Another risk is that
in a federal system, constituents in small states or provinces be-
come powerless, as candidates shift their focus to the more popu-
lous regions, which carry more electoral votes.
Direct voting is particularly common for unicameral coun-
tries. Of the twenty-six unicameral countries in Africa, twenty-
four countries have a direct vote:65 only Guinea-Bissau and Libya
provide that citizens elect all legislative representatives indi-
rectly. 66 In contrast, bicameral countries in Africa tend to have a
mixture of direct and indirect elections. That is to say, in coun-
tries with two houses of parliament, the representatives in one
house are elected directly, while in the other house they are
elected through an indirect vote. In fact, of the twenty-seven bi-
cameral African nations, only Madagascar has citizens directly
elect all legislators, and only Swaziland has all legislators indi-
rectly elected. 67 Seventeen countries use a mixed method of vot-
ing, twelve of which have one house with legislators elected
directly and the other house indirectly, which gives the constitu-
ents the benefit of both systems and creates a system in which the
flaws of each system can be counterbalanced by the benefits of the
other. In three bicameral countries, the possibility for indirect
election, direct election, and/or the presidential appointment to
the legislature exists in the same house.68
65. ANGL. CONST. pt. I, arts. 78, 79; BENIN CONST. tit. II, arts. 79, 80; CENT. AFR.
REP. CONST. tit. IV, arts. 46, 47; COMOROS CONST. tit. III, art. 32; COTE D'IvoIRE
CONST. tit. IV, art. 58; DJIB. CONST. tit. V, art. 46; EGYPT CONST. pt. III, art. 62; GHANA
CONST. ch. 10, art. 93(1); GUINEA CONST. tit. I, art. 2; tit. IV, art. 47; MALI CONST. tit.
V, art. 61; MAURITIUS CONST. ch. V, pt. I, art. 31; MOZAM. CONST. ch. III, pt. III, § I,
art. 134; NAMIB. CONST. ch. VII, art. 46; RWANDA CONST. tit. I, art. 8; tit. III, ch. II, § I,
art. 58; SAO TOME & PRINCIPE CONST. pt. I, art. 6; SEN. CONST. tit. I, art. 3; tit. IV, art.
60; SEY. CONST. ch. VI, pt. I, art. 78(b); SOMAL. CONST. ch. IV, art. 61; TOGO CONST.
art. 52; TUNISIA CONST. ch. II, art. 19; UGANDA CONST. ch. VI, art. 78; ZAMBIA CONST.
pt. IV, art. 63. The only bicameral country with a direct vote in both houses is Mada-
gascar. MADAG. CONST. tit. V, § I, art. 66; § II, art. 77.
66. GUINEA-BIssAu CONST. tit. III, art. 47; LIBYA CONST. ch. I, art. 6.
67. SWAZ. CONST. ch. IV, art. 35; ch. V, pt. I, art. 40.
68. The bicameral countries that use both direct and indirect voting are: ALG.
CONST. pt. II, ch. II, art. 101; BURK. FASO CONST. tit. I, ch. IV, art. 33; tit. V, art. 80;
CAMEROON CONST. pt. I, art. 2; pt. III, ch. I, art. 15; ch. II, art. 20; CHAD CONST. tit. I,
arts. 6, 10; CONGO CONST. tit. I, art. 4; tit. V, art. 90; ETH. CONST. ch. I, art. 4; ch. III,
pt. II, art. 35; GABON CONST. tit. III, art. 2; LESOTHO CONST. ch. VI, pt. 1, art. 55;
MALAWI CONST. ch. VI, arts. 66, 70; MAURITANIA CONST. tit. III, art. 47; MOROCCO
CONST. tit. III, art. 37; NIGER. CONST. tit. I, art. 7; tit. V, § I, art. 64; TANZ. CONST. ch.
I, pt. I, art. 5; ch. III, pt. II, art. 66. The bicameral countries that utilize direct, indi-
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F. Regulating Elections
Many African constitutions delegate the authority and re-
sponsibility for ensuring, overseeing, and regulating legislative
elections. Legislative delegation typically provides for an organic
law on electoral process, and administrative delegation refers the
matter to an electoral commission or committee. For example,
constitutions may specify that the law or committee set the condi-
tions for the election, number of legislators, salary, conditions of
eligibility, system of ineligibilities and incompatibilities, and de-
termination of constituency boundaries.69
II. Service in Office: Authority to Act on Behalf of
Constituents
Once a candidate becomes a legislator, the analysis turns to
questions regarding who that person represents and what powers
are vested in the representative to advance those interests. This
section starts by analyzing general provisions addressing the du-
ties of legislative representatives and the rights of constituents. It
then examines a range of specific authorities that may be availa-
ble to or prohibited from the legislative representative. These
powers include free speech, parliamentary debate, lawmaking (in-
cluding the ability to introduce private members bills), budgetary
authority, and a personal vote.
A. Duties of Legislators and Rights of Constituents
Legislators can have a constitutional duty to represent their
constituents, the citizens of the nation, special interest groups or a
combination of these groups. Some constitutions are ambiguous
as to whom a legislator represents, and many constitutions do not
address the issue.
Various African constitutions provide legislators with the spe-
cific duty to represent constituents or the citizens of the nation.
rect, or presidential appointment in the same houses are: Algeria, Botswana, Ethio-
pia, Lesotho, and Malawi. The unicameral countries that use both indirect and direct
voting are: BOTS. CONST. ch. V, pt. I, arts. 57, 58; GAM. CONST. ch. V, pt. 3, art. 48;
KENYA CONST. ch. III, pt. 1, art. 34; SUDAN CONST. pt. IV, ch. II, art. 67. In Comoros,
article 32 of the constitution points to an organic law to create the voting policy.
COMOROS CONST. tit. III, art. 32.
69. In twenty-six countries, constitutions provide for an organic law that estab-
lishes election procedures. In sixteen additional countries, electoral commissions or
committees are responsible for determining electoral law pursuant to the constitu-
tions. Eleven constitutions are silent on the issue.
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Such provisions can provide a broad but clear fiduciary mandate
for legislators to represent their constituents' interests. Alterna-
tively, provisions specifying that legislators are charged with ad-
vancing the interest of the nation's citizens writ large can promote
national interests at the potential expense of a localized constitu-
ency. It can be challenging to balance national harmony, unity,
prosperity, and identity with ensuring that the majority does not
trample individual and minority rights. While the interests of a
minority group might not prevail in a particular instance, effective
legislative representation can help to ensure that the interests are
voiced publicly and considered in the deliberative process.
Legislative representation of minority interests is particu-
larly important for matters of natural resources control and man-
agement. With seventy percent of African citizens living in rural
areas, removed from the seats of power, and dependant on natural
resources, decisions by the legislature and the government,
whether made to benefit the nation as a whole or a particular re-
gion, can affect communities in different ways. Industrial devel-
opment, mining of precious metals, gems, and common varieties,
large-scale timber operations, and other initiatives can bring
much needed economic development and hard currency. At the
same time, these actions often have environmental, social, and
public health effects on the surrounding area. This can affect such
fundamental activities as constituents' ability to protect, for ex-
ample, their land and their jobs, access to safe drinking water,
and medical attention. 70 Legislative representation helps to en-
sure that such efforts can be known, mitigated, and compensated.
Even when a legislator has the duty and motivation to speak
for a constituency, doing so can be detrimental to the legislator's
career. For example, in Uganda, where Members of Parliament
are "elected to represent constituencies" 71 through FPTP elec-
tions, an MP has been supporting a group of citizens opposing the
cancellation of their permits for a tree farm, which the govern-
ment had sought in order to grant a concession to a sugar com-
pany. For advocating on behalf of his constituency, however, the
MP "has been labeled a sympathizer of the opposition and an 'eco-
nomic saboteur' by the president."72
70. Veit et al., supra note 14, at 19.
71. UGANDA CONST. ch. VI, art. 78(1)(a).
72. Veit et al., supra note 14, at 19.
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In twelve countries, legislators are accountable to the people
of the nation, but not necessarily to a particular constituency.
73
In contrast, Tanzania and Uganda impose a constitutional duty on
legislators to represent their constituents. 74 Seven legislative bi-
cameral constitutions have different provisions regarding the duty
of representation for legislators in each house, such as in Congo
where Senators represent the territorial districts and members of
the National Assembly represents the entire nation.75 When
taken together, these provisions mean that nine countries have
some legislators charged with representing a particular constitu-
ency while nineteen countries have legislators who are charged
with representing the nation's citizens. These tallies, as through-
out the paper, reflect both unicameral and bicameral countries,
with some bicameral nations delegating different responsibilities
to each house.
While legislators may be charged with representing various
interests, these interests may, on occasion, collide. For example,
popular will can run counter to constitutional requirements, and
different representatives' consciences can vary greatly. In
Tanzania, legislators could be confused as to where their primary
loyalties lie: as a result of a PR electoral system, in which the po-
litical parties determine which individuals will become legislators,
elected representatives would appear to owe their primary alle-
giance to their party. However, article 66(1)(a) of the Tanzanian
Constitution provides that representatives are elected to re-
present constituencies. While specific examples of African legisla-
tors representing constituencies are not commonly reported in
scholarly literature, one of the few examples comes from
Tanzania. After wildlife rangers in Tanzania allegedly killed fifty
subsistence hunters in the Serengeti National Park, the Member
of Parliament representing the region launched a parliamentary
investigation into the incident. 76
73. BENIN CONST. tit. II, art. 80; CAPE VERDE CONST. pt. V, tit. III, ch. V, § II, art.
174; COTE D'IvoIRE CONST. tit. IV, art. 66; DJIB. CONST. tit. IV, art. 49; ETH. CONST.
ch. VI, pt. I, art. 54(4); GUINEA-BISSAU CONST. tit. III, ch. I, art. 49(2); NAmIB. CONST.
ch. VII, art. 45; NIGER. CONST. tit. IV, § I, art. 66; SAO TOME & PRINCIPE CONST. tit.
III, art. 82(2); ToGo CONST. tit. III, art. 52; TUNIs. CONST. ch. II, art. 25; ZAMBLA
CONST. pt. I, art. 1.
74. TANz. CONST. ch. III, pt. II, art. 66; UGANDA CONST. ch. VI, art. 78(1)(a).
75. CONGO CONST. tit. V, art. 90.
76. Veit et al., supra note 14, at 14 (the epilogue to this incident touches on the
fourth aspect of representation-ambition-as the legislative representative was sub-
sequently appointed deputy minister. Nevertheless, the legislator did represent and
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Often, a legislator not only has the duty to represent a local-
ized or national constituency, but citizens have the right to repre-
sentation. When constituents have the right to have their
interests represented, they have a stronger moral and legal claim
to press their representatives to bring government resources and
other support to the district, such as support for local schools,
health clinics, and water supplies.77 The constitutions of many
countries are ambiguous about the duties of legislators, but those
constitutions do articulate that the citizens have the right to be
represented. The language that establishes this right often looks
similar to the constitution of the Central African Republic, which
provides that "national sovereignty belongs to the people who ex-
ercise it directly by means of referendum or indirectly by their
representatives."78
Twenty-four African constitutions vest sovereignty in the peo-
ple of the nation. Of these African nations, almost half on the con-
tinent that vest sovereignty with the people are then able to
delegate responsibility for the exercise of that sovereignty to
elected representatives. Of these twenty-four nations, it is diffi-
cult to generalize. There is a fairly even split of countries that use
PR and FPTP systems, as well as bicameral and unicameral par-
liaments. Six countries use a PR electoral system and ten coun-
tries use a form of FPTP (or Two-Round) system, with four using a
mixed method for electing legislative representatives. 79 Eight
countries that grant sovereignty to the people are bicameral, and
the remaining twelve are unicameral.
B. Protection of Speech
One of the most basic yet effective tools available to legisla-
tors to advance the interests of constituents is through speech and
advance his constituents' interests against the government, illustrating one way in
which representation issues can affect a community's access to resources).
77. Id. at 12.
78. CENT. AFR. REP. CONST. tit. II, art. 18.
79. The countries with PR election systems are: ALG. CONST. pt. II, ch. II, art. 100;
BURK. FASO CONST. tit. II, art. 32; ERI. CONST. ch. IV, art. 31(4); EQ. GUINEA CONST.
§ V, art. 60; LIBYA CONST. ch. II, art. 1; MOZAM. CONST. ch. III, pt. III, § I, art. 110.
The countries which use FPTP election systems are: CENT. AFR. REP. CONST. tit.
IV, ch. I, art. 18; GABON CONST. tit. III, art. 3; GAM. CONST. cl. VII, pt. 1, art. 112(b);
GHANA CONST. ch. VII, art. 47(1); MALAWI CONST. ch. I, art. 6; MALI CONST. tit. V, art.
26; NIG. CONST. ch. V, pt. I, art. 14(2)(a)(b); RWANDA CONST. tit. III, ch. II, § I, art. 6;
SEN. CONST. tit. VI, art. 3; SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. VI, pt. I, arts. 5, 97.
The following countries use a combination electoral system: LIBER. CONST. ch. V,
art. 1; MADAG. CONST. tit. V, § I, ch. I, art. 6; MoRocco CONST. tit. III, arts. 36, 2.
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advocacy. Whether on the floor of Parliament, at a press confer-
ence, or in a town meeting, a legislative representative can use the
bully pulpit to bring political and public attention to a matter.
The representative can highlight problems, propound solutions,
and pose pointed or difficult questions, as may be appropriate.
Through free political speech, a representative can shine a spot-
light on problems that need to be addressed and weaknesses in
proposed legislation, as well as illuminate options for resolving
those issues.
Most constitutions seek to protect legislative representatives
from harassment or retribution for exercising their rights to speak
out on political matters. These constitutions guarantee that legis-
lative representatives have the freedom from prosecution, judg-
ment, arrest, and investigation regarding opinions voiced in the
exercise of their duties.80 By including such provisions, most con-
stitutions ensure that legislators have the freedom to act indepen-
dently and in the best interest of whomever they are called upon
to represent. Legislators are thus able to say what needs to be
said, even if it is unpopular with the government, a political party,
the public, or the legislature.
Thirty-nine African constitutions protect the speech of legisla-
tors, while fourteen are silent on the issue.8 1 These provisions
80. See, e.g., MAURITANIA CONST. tit. III, art. 50, which states:
No member of Parliament may be prosecuted, pursued, arrested, detained
or tried because of the opinions or votes voiced by him during the exercise
of his functions. No member of Parliament, while Parliament is in ses-
sion, may be prosecuted or arrested for a criminal or penal matter, except
with the authorization of the assembly to which he belongs, unless it is a
case of flagrante delicto. No member of Parliament, while Parliament is
out of session, may be arrested, except with the authorization of the office
of the assembly to which he belongs, unless it is a case of flagrante delicto,
or authorized prosecution or a judicial sentence. The detention or prose-
cution of a member of Parliament shall be suspended if the assembly to
which he belongs demands it.
Id.
81. ALG. CONST. pt. II, ch. II, art. 109; BENIN CONST. tit. IV, art. 90; BURK. FASO
CONST. tit. I, art. 95; BURUNDI CONST. tit. VI, art. 103; CAPE VERDE CONST. pt. V, tit.
III, ch. V, art. 18; CENT. AFR. REP. CONST. tit. IV, ch. I, art. 49; CHAD CONST. tit. IV,
art. 114; COMOROS CONST. tit. III, art. 33; CONGO CONST. tit. VI, art. 95; COTE D'IvoIRE
CONST. tit. IV, art. 67; DJIB. CONST. tit. V, art. 51; EGYPT CONST. pt. V, ch. II, art. 98;
EQ. GUINEA CONST. § V, art. 68; ERI. CONST. ch. IV, art. 38; ETH. CONST. ch. VI, pt. I,
art. 54(5); pt. II, art. 63(1); GABON CONST. tit. III, art. 38; GAM. CONST. ch. VII, pt. 5,
arts. 38, 113; GUINEA CONST. tit. IV, art. 52; GHANA CONST. ch. X, arts. 115, 116(1);
GUINEA-BIssAu CONST. tit. III, ch. I, art. 53; LIBER. CONST. ch. IV, art. 42; MADAG.
CONST. tit. V, § II, ch. I, art. 69; MALAWI CONST. ch. VI, art. 60; MALI CONST. tit. V, art.
62; MAURITANIA CONST. tit. III, art. 50; MOROCCO CONST. tit. III, art. 39; MOZAM.
CONST. pt. III, § I, art. 145; NIGER. CONST. tit. IV, § I, art. 67; RWANDA CONST. tit. III,
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seem to be found in a wide range of political systems, although
FPTP systems appear to protect speech with a little more regular-
ity. There are ten provisions from countries with a PR system of
election and nineteen provisions from countries with a FPTP (in-
cluding Two-Round) system of election, or a combination of FPTP
and PR systems of election. In the countries with a PR system, in
which legislators depend on a party for their seat, protecting a leg-
islator's freedom of political speech presents a countervailing au-
thority for a legislator to advance the interests of the legislator's
constituency even if the legislator's party is opposed to that partic-
ular position. The more salient point, however, is that in either a
PR or FPTP system, an opposition legislator can advance positions
and ask nettlesome questions of the government or majority party
with less concern about reprisals. In effect, these provisions en-
sure that individual, minority party, and opposition representa-
tives have the full range of legislative authority inherent in their
office.
C. Legislative Authority: Initiating, Deliberating, and Adopting
a Law
In order for a legislative representative to fulfill the mandate
of representation (whether of a localized constituency or the na-
tional citizenry), representatives need legislative authority to act.
Three general forms of authority ensured in most constitutions
are the ability to initiate a bill, the power to debate and deliberate
on a bill, and the mandate to pass a bill into law. At the same
time, constitutions can limit a representative's legislative author-
ity through provisions circumscribing actions with budgetary or
fiscal implications. It may seem self-evident that legislative rep-
resentatives, as members of the legislative (i.e., law-making) body,
should have the authority to initiate, debate, amend, and adopt
laws. However, as discussed below, constitutions frequently con-
strain some of these authorities, making it more difficult for a rep-
resentative to advance the interests of the representative's
constituency.
ch. II, art. 66; SAO TOME & PRINCIPE CONST. pt. III, tit. III, art. 84; SEN. CONST. tit. VI,
art. 61; SEY. CONST. ch. VI, pt. IV, art. 102; SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. VI, pt. IV, arts.
98, 99; SOMAL. CONST. ch. IV, § I, art. 73(3); S. AFR. CONST. ch. IV, art. 58(1)(a), SUDAN
CONST. pt. V, ch. II, art. 82; TANz. CONST. ch. III, pt. III, art. 100; ToGo CONST. tit. III,
art. 53; TuNis. CONST. ch. II, art. 26.
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Twenty-six African constitutions give joint power to the presi-
dent, parliament, and government to initiate bills in the system. 2
Sudan's constitution provides that "[t]he President of the Repub-
lic, the Council of Ministers, any federal Minister as well as any
committee of the National Assembly or any member by private in-
itiative, may table a legislative bill to the Assembly."8 3 This provi-
sion further states that "[w]here the bill is by private initiative, it
shall not be tabled to the Assembly save after referring it to the
concerned committee to decide that it involves an important pub-
lic interest."8 4 Eleven of the twenty-six countries that ensure that
legislators have the ability to initiate a bill have a PR system of
election. Nine of the constitutions have a FPTP system of election,
while five constitutions use a combination of electoral systems.
Five constitutions also provide that the legislature alone has the
power to initiate bills.8 5 The constitution of Burkina Faso is the
only constitution that provides that "[tlhe people exercise the initi-
ative of laws by means of petition constituting a proposal drawn
and signed by at least 15,000 persons having the right to vote
under the conditions prescribed by law."8 6
Many constitutions place restrictions on the types of bills that
a legislator can initiate, deliberate, or pass. These restrictions
typically relate to finances, limiting the ability of legislators to in-
troduce bills that would create debt. Eleven African constitutions
restrict the economic power that legislators have during law mak-
82. ALG. CONST. pt. II, ch. I, art. 97; ch. II, art. 119; ANGL. CONST. pt. III, ch. II,
art. 66; ch. III, art. 93(1); ch. IV, art. 110; BENIN CONST. tit. IV, art. 105; BURK. FASO
CONST. tit. VI, art. 97; tit. VII, art. 112; BURUNDI CONST. tit. VII, arts. 119, 120; CAME-
ROON CONST. pt. III, tit. IV, art. 25; CAPE VERDE CONST. pt. IV, tit. I, ch. II, art. 109(1);
pt. V, tit. III, ch. IV, § I, art. 169; CENT. AFR. REP. CONST. tit. III, ch. I, art. 25; tit. IV,
ch. IV, art. 62; CHAD CONST. tit. V, art. 134; COMOROS CONST. tit. III, art. 37; CONGO
CONST. tit. VI, art. 110; tit. VII, art. 118; EQ. GUINEA CONST. § V, art. 75; GABON
CONST. art. 53; GUINEA CONST. tit. III, art. 45; tit. V, art. 68; GuINEA-BIssAu CONST.
tit. III, ch. I, arts. 60, 61(1); MADAGASCAR CONST. tit. IV, § I, art. 54; tit. V, § III, art.
84; MALI CONST. tit. I, art. 1; tit. VI, art. 75; MAURITANIA CONST. tit. IV, art. 61;
MOZAM. CONST. pt. III, ch. III, art. 137; SAO TOME & PRINCIPE CONST. pt. III, tit. III,
arts. 83(b), 88(1); SEN. CONST. tit. III, art. 51; tit. VII, art. 80; SEY. CONST. ch. VI, pt.
IV, arts. 94(1), (2); SoMAL. CONST. ch. IV, § I, art. 70; S. AFR. CONST. ch. IV, art.
55(1)(b); ch. V, art. 81(4)(f); SUDAN CONST. pt. IV, ch. II, art. 87(1); TUNIs. CONST. ch.
II, art. 28.
83. SUDAN CONST. pt. IV, ch. II, art. 87(1).
84. Id. pt. IV, ch. II, art. 87(2).
85. EGYPT CONST. pt. V, ch. II, art. 110; LESOTI-1O CONST. ch. V, pt. 1, art. 70;
LIBER. CONST. ch. V, art. 34; NAMIB. CONST. ch. VII, art. 63(2)(g); UGANDA CONST. ch.
VI, art. 90(3)(b).
86. BURK. FASO CONST. tit. VI, art. 97.
2003] 143
25
144 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21
ing.s 7 These constitutions provide that a legislator cannot intro-
duce a bill that affects the budget, with a few exceptions. For
example, in article 37 of the Comoros Constitution, the Parlia-
ment cannot adopt any law that would cause a diminution of pub-
lic resources. 8 Other restrictions in African constitutions address
constitutional revisions,8 9 amendments to bills,90 agenda set-
ting,91 and customary or tribal law.92
The ability to deliberate the bill gives legislators the power to
discuss and amend proposed legislation. This gives legislators the
authority and opportunity to help ensure that the legislature does
not pass legislation that will harm a representative's constituents
or the people of the nation. It ensures that all legislators can par-
ticipate in the process of creating legislation and that the voice of
the various constituencies will be heard, so long as the legislator's
freedom of speech is protected. There are twelve constitutions
that allow legislators to deliberate over a bill. 93 The constitution
87. ALG. CONST. pt. II, ch. II, art. 121; ANGL. CONST. pt. III, ch. III, art. 93(2);
BOTS. CONST. art. 1; BURK. FASO CONST. tit. VII, art. 120; CAMEROON CONST. pt. III,
ch. I, art. 18(3); ch. II, art. 23(3); CAPE VERDE CONST. art. 129(5); COMOROS CONST. tit.
III, art. 37; COTE D'IvoIRE CONST. tit. V, art. 78; DJIB. CONST. tit. VIII, art. 69; KENYA
CONST. ch. III, pt. 2, art. 48(a); MAURITIUS CONST. ch. V, pt. II, art. 54(a)(i); TANz.
CONST. ch. III, pt. III, art. 99(2)(a).
88. COMOROS CONST. tit. III, art. 37.
89. BoTs. CONST. ch. V, pt. IV, art. 89; KENYA CONST. ch. III, pt. 2, art. 46(6);
MALAWI CONST. ch. V, pt. II, art, 66(2); MAURITIUS CONST. ch. V, pt. II, art. 47; ZAMBIA
CONST. pt. V, art. 79.
90. BURUNDI CONST. tit. VII, art. 121; COTE D'IvoIRE CONST. tit. V, art. 78.
91. E.g., CAMEROON CONST. ch. I, pt. III, arts. 18(4), (5) (addressing restrictions on
legislative representatives in the agenda-making process); ch. II, arts. 23(4), (5) (gov-
ernment restrictions in agenda-setting).
92. The Constitution of Botswana, for example, addresses this issue in article
88(2) as follows:
The National Assembly shall not proceed upon any Bill (including any
amendment to a Bill) that, in the opinion of the person presiding, would,
if enacted, alter any of the provisions of this Constitution or affect- (a)
the designation, recognition, removal of powers of Chiefs, Sub-Chiefs, or
Headmen, (b) the organization, powers, or administration of customary
courts, (c) customary law, or the ascertainment or recording of the cus-
tomary law; or (d) tribal organization or tribal property, unless (i) a copy
of the Bill has been referred to the House of Chiefs after it has been intro-
duced in the National Assembly; and (ii) a period of 30 days has elapsed
from the date when the copy of the Bill was referred to the House of
Chiefs.
BOTS. CONST. ch. V, pt. IV, § 88(2).
93. ALG. CONST. pt. II, ch. II, art. 120; BURK. FASO CONST. tit. VI, art. 97; BURUNDI
CONST. tit. VII, art. 121; CAPE VERDE CONST. pt. V, tit. III, ch. IV, § II, art. 172; CHAD
CONST. tit. V, art. 134; COMOROS CONST. tit. III, art. 37; CONGO CONST. tit. VII, art.
121; ETH. CONST. ch. VI, art. 57; GABON CONST. tit. II, art. 30; NIGER. CONST. tit. V,
art. 77; TANz. CONST. ch. III, pt. III, art. 97(1); TOGO CONST. tit. V, art. 92.
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of Ethiopia, article 57, describes the system by providing that
"[l]aws deliberated upon and passed by the House" will then be
passed to the president to sign, although if the President does not
sign the law within fifteen days it will pass without his or her
signature. 94
The final aspect of authority is the ability to actually pass a
law. Twenty-eight constitutions grant legislators the ability to
pass a bill.95 The Ethiopian Constitution provides in article 57
that the House will pass a law after deliberation, and article 55
enunciates the issues that are the responsibility of the House. For
the constituents and citizens of the nation to have a voice in the
government, the ability to introduce legislation, deliberate on
bills, and finally have a vote in the system is essential to the au-
thority of legislators to be able to act on behalf of constituents.
D. Guarantee and Protection of Personal Vote
In order to be able to represent constituents in an effective
manner, legislative representatives must have the authority to act
on their behalf. One key protection is the guarantee of represent-
atives to a "personal" vote, which ensures that they do not have to
vote as part of a block if doing so would not be in their constitu-
ents' interests. A number of constitutions establish the right to a
personal vote in provisions addressing the protection of vote.
Twenty constitutions ensure that legislative representatives
have a personal vote, with fifteen of the twenty countries allowing
the personal vote to be delegated. 96 Article 39 of the constitution
94. ETH. CONST. ch. VI, pt. I, art. 57.
95. ANGL. CONST. pt. III, ch. 1II, art. 88; BENIN CONST. tit. IV, art. 96; BoTS.
CONST. ch. V, pt. IV, art. 87; BURK. FASO CONST. tit. IV, art. 84; BURUNDI CONST. tit.
IV, art. 106; CAMEROON CONST. pt. III, ch. I, art. 19; CAPE VERDE CONST. pt. V, tit. III,
ch. IV, § II, art. 172; CENT. AFR. REP. CONST. tit. IV, ch. III, art. 55; CHAD. CONST. tit.
V, art. 125; COMOROS CONST. tit. III, art. 39; COTE D'IvoIRE CONST. tit. IV, art. 61; ERI.
CONST. ch. IV, arts. 32, 33; ETH. CONST. ch. VI, pt. I, arts. 54, 55; GABON CONST. tit.
III, art. 36; GUINEA CONST. tit. V, art. 59; GUINEA-BISSAU CONST. tit. III, ch. I, art. 56;
KENYA CONST. ch. III, pt. 2, art. 46; LIBER. CONST. ch. V, art. 29; MAURITANIA CONST.
tit. IV, art. 56; MAURITIUS CONST. ch. V, pt. II, art. 46; MoRocco CONST. tit. III, art.
45; SAO TOME & PRINCIPE CONST. pt. III, tit. III, art. 86; SEY. CONST. ch. V, art. 68;
SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. VI, pt. V, art. 106; S. AFR. CONST. ch. IV, arts. 44, 53, 55, 68,
75, 76; SUDAN CONST. pt. IV, ch. II, art. 73; TANz. CONST. ch. III, pt. III, art. 97;
ZAMBIA CONST. pt. V, art. 78.
96. BENIN CONST. tit. IV, art. 93; BURK. FASO CONST. tit. IV, art. 103; BURUNDI
CONST. tit. VI, art. 102; CENT. AFR. REP. CONST. tit. IV, ch. I, art. 50; CHAD. CONST. tit.
IV, art. 117; COMOROS CONST. tit. III, art. 36; CONGO CONST. tit. VI, art. 96; COTE
D'IvoIRE CONST. tit. IV, art. 66; GABON CONST. tit. III, art. 39; GUINEA CONST. tit. IV,
art. 57; MALI. CONST. tit. V, art. 64; MAURITANIA CONST. tit. III, art. 51; NIGER. CONST.
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of Gabon is typical, providing that "the right to vote .. .is per-
sonal."97 Rwanda is the only country that explicitly ensures that
legislative representatives cannot be required to vote in a particu-
lar way.98 Malawi and Senegal both provide that a representative
will not lose his or her seat for voting against the representative's
party but will if the representative changes parties.99 Some con-
stitutions provide that a legislator can forfeit her seat in the legis-
lature if she votes against her party. This will be addressed in
more detail in section III, below.
As with the discussion above regarding the protection of a leg-
islative representative's speech, constitutional provisions guaran-
teeing a representative's votes reinforce the ability of legislative
representatives to act on behalf of constituents. These constitu-
tions permit representatives to cast their votes without fear of in-
vestigation, arrest, and prosecution.
Twenty-seven African constitutions, over half, protect a legis-
lator's vote. 100 The language of these provisions usually is similar
to that of article 90 of Benin's constitution, which provides that:
"The members of the National Assembly shall enjoy parliamen-
tary immunity. As a consequence, no Deputy may be followed,
searched, arrested, detained, or judged for opinions or votes issued
by him during the exercise of his duties." 101 These provisions oc-
tit. IV, § I, art. 66; SEN. CONST. tit. VI, art. 64; TOGO CONST. tit. III, art. 56. The
constitutions that ensure a personal vote but are silent on the issue of delegation are:
Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar and Rwanda. Malawi's Constitution ensures a per-
sonal vote but does not allow for a legislative representative to delegate his or her
vote.
97. GABON CONST. tit. III, art. 39. "The regulations of each Chamber exception-
ally authorize the delegation of the vote. No one can receive the delegation of more
than one mandate." Id.
98. "Any required mandate shall be invalid: the Deputies' right to vote shall be
personal." RWANDA CONST. tit. III, ch. II, § I, art. 59.
99. MALAWI CONST. ch. VI, art. 65.
100. ALG. CONST. pt. II, ch. II, art. 109; BENIN CONST. tit. IV, art. 90; BURK. FASO
CONST. tit. V, art. 95; BURUNDI CONST. tit. VI, art. 103; CAPE VERDE CONST. pt. V, tit.
III, ch. V, § II, art. 181; CENT. AFR. REP. CONST. tit. IV, art. 49; CHAD CONST. tit. IV,
art. 114; COMOROS CONST. tit. III, art. 33; CONGO CONST. tit. VI, art. 101; COTE
D'IvoIRE CONST. tit. IV, art. 67; DJIB. CONST. tit. V, art. 51; ETH. CONST. ch. VI, pt. I,
art. 54(5); ch. VI, pt. II, art. 63(1); GABON CONST. tit. III, art. 38; GUINEA CONST. tit.
IV, art. 52; GUINEA-BISSAU CONST. tit. III, ch. I, art. 53; LIBER. CONST. ch. V, art. 42;
MADAG. CONST. tit. V, § 1, ch. I, art. 69; MALAWI CONST. ch. VI, art. 64(1); MALI CONST.
tit. V, art. 62; MAURITANIA CONST. tit. III, art. 50; MOROCCO CONST. tit. III, art. 39;
MOZAM. CONST. pt. III, ch. III, § I, art. 145; NIGER. CONST. tit. IV, art. 67; RWANDA
CONST. tit. III, ch. II, § I, art. 66; SAO TOME & PRINCIPE CONSW. pt. III, tit. III, art. 84;
TANz. CONST. ch. III, art. 100(1); TOGO CONST. tit. IV, art. 53.
101. BENIN CONST. tit. IV, art. 90.
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cur in a variety of electoral systems: twelve constitutions that pro-
tect legislators' votes use an FPTP or Two-Round System; eight
have a combination FPTP/PR system; and seven constitutions
with these provisions use a PR system.10 2 In five constitutions, it
is unclear what electoral system the country uses.
III. Removing a Legislator from Office: Accountability to
Whom?
The power to remove an elected legislator from office provides
the clearest context for determining whether a legislator is able or
compelled to represent a constituency in an effective manner.
This section focuses on accountability of legislators to their con-
stituents through citizen recall measures, as well as accountabil-
ity of legislators to political parties through recall and forfeiture.
As with the rest of this article, the analysis considers only consti-
tutional provisions, although many of the disciplinary measures
available to political parties may be found in non-constitutional
enactments such as anti-defection laws, parliamentary proce-
dures, and party documents. 10 3 In certain instances, the legisla-
ture can revoke a representative's mandate.' 0 4 Constitutional
provisions also address actions that may lead to a legislator
forfeiting his or her seat.
A. Accountability to Citizens: Recall
One way that constitutions ensure that legislators represent
the interests of the constituents is by providing the right of citi-
zens or constituents to recall a legislator. When a constituency
can recall its elected legislative representative, the representative
is more likely to accord significant insight to the views and needs
of his or her constituency in deciding how to vote or otherwise act.
As such, recall promotes representation. While the prospect of a
recall campaign will not necessarily guarantee that a legislator
will be in accord with the wishes of the constituency, the knowl-
edge that a constituency is watching the actions of its elected rep-
102. See supra note 47 and accompanying Table 2 in text.
103. See generally Veit et al., supra note 14.
104. In addition to potential sanction by the public, a political party, and the legis-
lature, legislative representatives may be subject to recall by the executive branch or
tribal authorities (often referred to generally as "local notables"). While beyond the
scope of this article, the constitutional role of tribes, kingdoms, and traditional com-
munities in African politics in the context of representation as well as their relation-
ship to the state more generally merits further analysis.
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resentative and has the actual power to remove its representative
from office can serve as a strong incentive for a representative to
heed the constituency's views.
Seven countries grant citizens the right to recall legislative
representatives. 10 5 Five of the seven countries use the FPTP elec-
toral system; the remaining two electoral systems are unknown.
In Ethiopia, which has a FPTP system, a representative's constit-
uents have the power to recall the representative, even though the
representatives are charged with representing the citizens of the
nation. 10 6 Uganda, also a FPTP country, is the only nation in
which the constitution gives legislators the duty to represent their
constituents and constituents the power to recall their elected
officials.10 7
B. Accountability to Political Parties: Recall and Forfeiture
In countries that have a PR electoral system, the seats that
legislators occupy generally are viewed as belonging to the party
that won them in the election, and the legislators have to answer
to the political party that won the seats. One way that a party can
retain control over its elected members is through the power to
recall legislators who do not act or vote as the party wishes. For
example, in Malawi, the Speaker of the National Assembly de-
clared that a legislator, also from the ruling party, lost his man-
date once he joined an umbrella organization of NGOs and
opposition members after he had been investigating the diversion
by senior officials of maize for personal gain.108
Only three constitutions provide for a party to have the power
to recall a legislator. In Namibia, Seychelles, and South Africa,
countries with PR systems, legislators answer to their party
through the threat of recall. '0 9 In such systems, a legislator could
find it difficult to look out for constituents (even if such constitu-
ents may be ascertained in a PR system), because the legislator
would face the threat of recall by the party if the legislator did not
hew to the party's position. The Seychelles Constitution provides
that a legislator must vacate his or her seat if the party nominates
105. ETH. CONST. ch. II, art. 12; ch. VI, pt. I, art. 54; GAM. CONST. ch. VII, pt. 1, art.
92(a); LIBER. CONST. ch. I, art. 1; MALAWI CONST. ch. VI, art. 63; NIG. CONST. ch. V, pt.
I, art. 69; SoMAL. CONST. ch. IV, § I, art. 74; UGANDA CONST. ch. VI, art. 84(3).
106. See ETH. CONST. ch. II, art. 12(3).
107. See UGANDA CONST. ch. VI, art. 26.
108. Veit et al., supra note 14, at 15.
109. NAMIB. CONST. ch. VII, art. 48(1)(a); S. AFR. CONST. ch. IV, arts. 62(4)(c), (d);
SEY. CONST. ch. VI, pt. I, art. 81(1)(h)(i).
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someone else. 110 The South African Constitution provides that a
political party can recall a representative from the National Coun-
cil of Provinces (one of two legislative houses) when the represen-
tative "has lost the confidence of the provincial legislature and is
recalled by the party that nominated that person; or ceases to be a
member of the party that nominated that person and is recalled by
that party.. . ."I Similarly, the Namibian Constitution provides
that a Member of Parliament must vacate his or her seat in Par-
liament if his or her political party declares the MP to no longer be
a member of that party. 112
Although only three constitutions provide that a political
party may recall its legislative representatives, many constitu-
tions provide that a representative must vacate his or her seat if
the representative changes political parties once in office, or de-
clares independence from the party. This set of provisions may be
distinguished from the Namibian provision, in that Namibia's con-
stitution grants powers to a party to eject a representative from
the party and thus the legislature, while the other provisions are
more narrowly circumscribed.1 13 These provisions apply only
when the representative actually leaves or changes parties. 114 If
an independent representative joins a political party, these consti-
tutions typically provide that the representative will lose his or
her seat as a result.
These provisions satisfy various ends. In PR systems, in
which a designated number of legislative positions are allocated to
a political party based on the proportion of votes won in an elec-
tion, these provisions help to ensure that there is continued pro-
portional representation of the popular vote. These provisions
help to protect constituents against competition, in which a party
could seek to buy a seat by bribing or otherwise compelling a legis-
lator to change political parties. The provisions also help to pro-
tect the interests of constituents who, when voting in elections,
are presumably voting for the platform of the party. If the legisla-
tor switches parties, such a switch takes away (at least some) of
the constituency's voice. These constitutional provisions seek to
110. SEY. CONST. ch. VI, pt. 1, art. 81(1)(h).
111. S. AFR. CONST. ch. IV, arts. 62(4)(c), (d).
112. NAMm. CONST. ch. VII, art. 48(1)(d).
113. Id.
114. While such provisions seem to apply only when a legislator elects to leave a
party or change parties, these provisions could be interpreted to apply in a situation
where a party expels a legislator, in which case the legislator could be deemed to
"leave" the party and thus lose his or her seat.
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protect constituents who may have voted for the party or candi-
date on the basis of a specific platform that the representative
subsequently abandons.
At the same time, these provisions could be applied to the det-
riment of constituents. If a legislator believes that it is in the best
interest of the constituency to change political parties and join a
party more in line with the needs of his or her constituents, the
legislator is effectively barred from doing so at the risk of losing
his or her seat, sacrificing the constituency's interests as a result.
Seventeen African constitutions provide that a legislator
must vacate his or her seat if he or she switches alignment (i.e.,
parties, party to independent, or independent to party). Of these
seventeen, seven countries have an FPTP electoral system, six a
PR system, and four use a combination electoral system.11
5
C. Legislative Recall
One way that constitutions can promote good legislative gov-
ernance and protect the interests of the citizens is by granting
power to legislators to voice concern about and recall fellow legis-
lators for inappropriate behavior or inability. Legislators can use
such provisions to recall corrupt but locally popular legislators. At
the same time, legislators could use this power to remove locally
popular representatives who distinguish themselves through their
integrity and high ethical standards, but who may advocate posi-
tions that are unpopular with their peers.116 Seven constitutions
have provisions for a legislative recall of legislators. 1 7 Four of the
countries that have this constitutional provision to recall-Alge-
ria, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia, and Sao Tome & Principe-have a
PR system of election.
115. The countries that use a FPTP system are Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria,
Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zambia. The constitutions that include a PR electoral
system are Angola, Cape Verde, Namibia, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. The
countries that use a combination system are Kenya, Malawi, Seychelles, and South
Africa.
116. ALG. CONST. pt. II, ch. II, arts. 106, 107; EGYPT CONST. pt. V, ch. II, arts. 96,
97; GuINEA-BIssAu CONST. tit. III, ch. I, art. 54; LIBER. CONST. ch. V, art. 38; MALAwI
CONST. ch. VI, art. 63; NAMIB. CONST. ch. VII, art. 48; SAo TOME & PRINCIPE CONST.
pt. III, tit. III, art. 85; SoMAL. CONST. ch. IV, art. 74.
117. Algeria, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe, and
Somalia.
[Vol. 21150
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol21/iss1/7
LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION
D. Leaving Office
Frequently, constitutions establish provisions that state the
circumstances under which a legislator may choose-or be com-
pelled-to leave the legislature. The most common constitutional
provision compelling a legislator to leave office is when the legisla-
tor changes parties or joins a party. In fact, if a legislator does not
vote with his or her party, the legislator could be deemed to con-
structively cross the aisle. 118 Other constitutional provisions that
provide grounds for leaving office include missing a certain num-
ber of sessions, entering bankruptcy, becoming no longer qualified
under election requirements, resigning for personal reasons, ac-
cepting another government position such as ambassador, com-
mitting a crime, or being found to be of unsound mind. Eleven
constitutions provide for legislators to leave office separately from
the issues of their political party.119
IV. Conclusion
In Africa, natural resources are a source of wealth, power,
and livelihoods. 120 The majority of African people living in rural
areas are particularly dependent on natural resources for food,
fuel, shelter, fiber, and income. A great diversity of wildlife,
plants, and vistas are only found in Africa. In seeking to sustain-
ably manage these resources for environmental, social, and eco-
nomic objectives, attention increasingly turns to the governing
processes. Scholars, advocates, and the international community
have focused much of their attention on strengthening civil society
as well as capacity for government agencies. Additional scholar-
ship and capacity building has sought to promote judicial indepen-
dence and capability to hear and decide cases with environmental
implications.
118. See, e.g., SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. VI, pt. I, art. 77(l)(1) ("A Member of Parlia-
ment shall vacate his seat in Parliament-if by his conduct in Parliament by sitting
and voting with members of a different party, the Speaker is satisfied after consulta-
tion with the Leader of that Member's party that the Member is no longer a member
of the political party under whose symbol he was elected to Parliament ... ").
119. ANGL. CONST. pt. III, ch. III, arts. 85 (a), (b); BOTS. CONST. ch. V, pt. I, art. 68;
ch. IX, art. 125(1); CONGO CONST. tit. VI, art. 98; GAM. CONST. ch. VII, pt. 1, art. 91;
GHANA CONST. ch. X, art. 97; KENYA CONST. ch. III, pt. 1, art. 39; LESOTHO CONST. ch.
VI, pt. 1, art. 60; RWANDA CONST. tit. II, ch. I, § I, art. 67; SEY. CONST. ch. VI, pt. I, art.
81(1)(h); SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. V, pt. II, art. 71; UGANDA CONST. ch. VI, art. 83(g).
120. NATURE, WEALTH, AND POWER: EMERGING BEST PRACTICE FOR REVITALIZING
RURAL AFRICA (2002), at http://www.dec.org/pdf docs/pnacr288.pdf.
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In recent years, interest in promoting good governance
through legislative institutions has grown. Some of the interest is
motivated by specific experiences; for example, where a legislative
representative was effectively unable to represent his or her con-
stituency due to legislative or constitutional constraints. As this
article has highlighted, legislative representation in African con-
stitutions can be quite complex. There are few generalizations
that may be made, and many of the electoral and legislative sys-
tems in Africa have elements that are unique to the particular
country. Moreover, as a matter of law and practice, the election,
authority, and removal of legislative representatives is a combina-
tion of constitutional provisions, legislation, parliamentary rules,
and politics. This article has examined the ways in which African
constitutions seek to promote or limit (often both) the ability of
legislative representatives to represent the interests of a particu-
lar constituency.
It is worth noting that all African countries have some consti-
tutional provisions affecting the ability of an elected representa-
tive to represent a constituency. These provisions may relate to
accountability to constituents, independence from political par-
ties, authority to act on behalf of constituents, and ambition. At
the same time, no country's constitution fully addresses all of
these issues. In some instances, the constitution foresees a legis-
lative framework that resolves the issues, in some other instances,
the constitution is vague, and in yet other instances, the constitu-
tion is silent.
Almost all African constitutions vest sovereignty in the citi-
zens of the nation; however, only a small fraction of them specifi-
cally provide that a legislative representative has the duty to
represent a constituency. More often, constitutions address spe-
cific issues of representation, such as the process for electing rep-
resentatives, the authorities of representatives, and the removal
of representatives.
The system by which legislative representatives are elected
affects whether the representative has a constituency to which the
representative is directly accountable (for example, in subsequent
elections), or whether the representative is more indebted to a po-
litical party for the seat. There appears to be a roughly even split
between countries that follow some form of PR electoral system
and those that follow a FPTP system. Some countries follow a
combination of systems, which may also entail some representa-
tives appointed by the executive branch. Civil law countries tend
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to adopt PR electoral systems, and common law countries tend to
follow FPTP electoral systems, but there are plenty of exceptions.
The conditions by which citizens elect representatives gener-
ally promote representation. Most countries protect citizens' votes
as secret, with suffrage usually universal and often explicitly
deemed to be "equal." The vast majority of African countries allow
citizens to elect directly at least some representatives (only two do
not): twenty-four of twenty-six unicameral countries ensure a di-
rect vote, and most bicameral nations provide for a combination of
directly and indirectly elected representatives.
Many constitutions that address political parties seek to en-
sure that these parties are not associated with tribes, ethnic
groups, or a religion. Instead, they seek to promote national unity
by requiring political parties to advance national objectives.
Many constitutions reserve seats in the legislature for particular
interest groups, such as women, agriculture, and "society." Some
representatives who hold these seats are elected, and some are
appointed either by parliament or the prime minister. For these
special interest groups, different election rules usually apply.
African constitutions frequently seek to ensure that legisla-
tive representatives have the ability to carry out their legislative
duties and to represent constituents once they are in office. In
fact, a constitutional protection of a representative's speech and
expression is the most common provision considered in this arti-
cle. Almost three-quarters of African nations guarantee that a
representative cannot be investigated, arrested, or prosecuted for
opinions expressed in the representative's professional capacity.
Such provisions help to ensure that a representative can, on be-
half of constituents, utilize the bully pulpit to bring public atten-
tion to issues, to criticize, and to propose solutions. Moreover,
most constitutions also protect the representative's vote. Where
constitutions do not guarantee representatives' speech, opinion, or
vote, they were silent; however, no constitution explicitly limits
these legislative authorities.
In almost half of the African countries, constitutions grant the
power to legislative representatives to introduce legislative bills.
In many countries, this power is shared with the executive branch
(including the prime minister), and may be limited to committees
and bills that do not have financial effects on the nation's budget.
A number of countries, though, recognize the constitutional au-
thority of a representative to introduce a private member's bill. In
contrast, only a few African constitutions specifically provide for
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deliberation of bills. Just over half of the countries provide repre-
sentatives with the authority to adopt legislation.
When it comes to power to remove a legislative representa-
tive-perhaps the ultimate sanction-only seven African nations
allow citizens to recall a representative, and eight provide for leg-
islative recall. In contrast, seventeen nations allow parties to re-
call or otherwise remove a representative from office, usually
when a representative switches parties.
Together, these various constitutional provisions entail a
range of mandates, duties, rights, and protections. Some of them
are general, while others are specific. As a practical matter, some
of the provisions are more hortatory or theoretical in their charac-
ter while others have very real implications. For instance, re-
quirements that a legislative representative be in a political party
to run for office or that the representative remain with the politi-
cal party once in office can constrain a representative from acting
on behalf of a constituency when doing so runs counter to com-
mands from the representative's party.
How the conflicting authorities on legislative representation
in a particular country play out in a particular instance is largely
unresolved. There are, as Veit and colleagues have highlighted in
their survey of African experiences, a number of instances in
which representatives have been able to represent constituents
(particularly in environmental and natural resource matters), and
even more instances in which representation has been problem-
atic. While the constitutional provisions in this article may entail
only a part of the framework for legislative representation in Af-
rica, they do establish guiding principles, even if these principles
conflict from time to time.
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